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agricultural policy, such as Wendell Berry, Gregg
Easterbrook, Jim Hightower, Glenn Johnson, Richard
Kirkendall, and Luther Tweeten. Expositions of the
1985 Farm Bill by Jesse Helms and of the alternative
Save the Family Fann Act, by Tom Harkin, provide a
useful discussion of the options Congress has
considered. To my knowledge this volume is the only
one of its kind, and despite my reservations about some
of the essays, it should serve as a valuable source for
anyone interested in the fann crisis of the 1980's. It
should also serve well as a text for courses in which
agricultural problems are considered.
About two-thirds ofthe essays consist ofpapers written
for a 1985 Iowa State University Conference, and onethird are reprinted from other sources. Comstock has
contributed a brief preface to each of the eight parts with
additional suggested readings at the end of each, a general
introduction, conclusion, and an index.
The title notwithstanding, the essays do not
constitute a sustained ethical or philosophical analysis
of the question posed. Taken together, the articles do
attempt to define the problems associated with family
fanning in the 1980's. The volume has two apparent
themes: (1) to show why failing small and mediumsized farmers cannot be assigned complete responsibility for their plight, and (2) to give positive
arguments for saving these fanns and traditional rural
American life. There is almost no one arguing for

The farm crisis of the 1980's precipitated much
discussion from persons in all walks of life, especially
in the Midwest where everyone knows someone who
lost a farm or a business dependent on farming. Of
special concern to the contributors to Is There a Moral
Obligation to Save the Family Farm? is the decline of
medium-sized farms which are operated by a family
and/or extended family on a full-time basis.! It is the
loss of a way of life, of farms passed from generation
to generation, that is disturbing to most of the
commentators who argue for the preservation offamily
fanning. Economists bent on cost-benefit analyses with
efficiency in dollars and cents terms are often cast as
the opposition, although nobody that hardnosed is
represented in this volume. On the affirmative side are
those who try to give good reasons for what finally must
be political and financial intervention to save a way of
life that is fast-fading from American society.
This collection of thirty-one essays brings together
some of the best-known commentators and critics of
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plowing under the family farm, and only Easterbrook's
article, which opens the debate, could be classed in the
negative. Even Luther Tweeten in his rigorous
economic analysis sets pure economic efficiency aside
to claim that we ought to save the family farm on
grounds that it is an important American tradition. So,
the main debate here is not whether we have an
obligation to save the family farm, but rather, which
are the best reasons for fulfilling that obligation.
The first theme is apparent in Parts III and IV.
Kirkendall's excellent short history of AmeriCan
agriculture gives the reader an even-handed look at how
family farms came to decline from once accounting for
over 70 percent of all households to less than 2 percent
today. He focuses on broad trends and policies in many
sectors of the U.S. Mechanization, hybrid seed technology, chemicals, commodity programs, and a general
tendency of Americans to encourage big business have
all played a part in making it possible for one person to
farm many more acres than ever before, for subsequent
increase in farm size concomitant with a decrease in
farm numbers. Paul Lasley, a sociologist who has done
extensive research on Iowa farm life, continues with
an informative financial history of the policies leading
up to the farm crisis. 'The 1970's brought a decline in
world food production, and U.S. agricultural policies
encouraged expansion of production. Heavy investment
in machinery and equipment followed, and farmers
bought more land in an era of continued inflation.
Bankers even encouraged farmers to take high-leverage
loans. Near the end of the decade the Federal Reserve
attacked inflation by raising interest rates, which
increased costs of production. Simultaneously, exports
began to decline, and land values fell precipitously,
pushing a large number of family farmers to the brink
of financial insolvency.
In addition to the theme of acquitting farmers of
complete responsibility, Lasley tackles "some tough
ethical questions," wondering how to provide a
justification for saving the family farm. He notes that
the much-prized rural virtues of independence and selfreliance have become less valuable to a society that is
increasingly interdependent. Worse yet, those once
esteemed virtues may lead to a "tragedy of the
commons" when each person seeking his or her own
self-interest may lead to the downfall of the whole group
(p. 108). For these reasons, Lasley thinks any argument
for saving the family farm must be one which
encompasses the values of both the farm and nonfarm
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population. Unfortunately, the question of how to
balance the interests, suffering, and values of these two
sectors is nowhere discussed in the book. The reason
for this omission may be that such issues were beyond
the scope of this volume.
Neil Harl, an economist, gives a broad overview of
the consequences to the national economy and to
agriculture of political intervention in the form of
commodity price supports, loans, and other government
programs. Documenting the nature and extent of the
financial stress experienced by farmers during the crisis,
he notes that some of the vulnerability experienced by
agriculture is not unique to it but instead is shared by
"any sector or subsector that is both capital-intensive
and export sensitive... " (p. 124). Harl's essay is
important because it emphasizes the economic interdependence of farmers with other sectors of society.
So, he concludes that it might be wise to save family
farms in order to save a myriad of other institutions
that interconnect with them.
Glenn Johnson gives a clear exposition of the
economic consequences of leverage and its relation to
efficiency. He points out, in opposition to the claims
of many economists, that leveraged and nonleveraged
farms do not differ in their efficiency, since each may
produce the same yield per acre of crop. Moreover,
society does not benefit from leveraged farms going
bankrupt. The assets and labor of that farm may be
worth more to society on the farm than anyone is willing
to pay for them at auction (p. 156). So, the myth that
the farmers who are squeezed out of business by being
heavily leveraged in times of deflation are really just
the bad managers and the inefficient farmers is
dispelled. The real problem is not that we have too
many farmers, but rather, that there is too much acreage
in production.
Jim Hightower repeats his well-known criticisms of
the land-grant institutions for their apparent failure to
carry out their mission to advance the cause of rural
life. Established to aid the small farmer, the colleges
have instead devoted considerable research time and
money to the development of technologies which
benefit large corporate farms and put smaller farmers
out of business.
Thus, in Parts III and IV we find the reasons to
understand why those who are losing their farms are
not simply bad managers who could be expected to fail.
We are also introduced to several arguments for saving
the family farm. Part V considers some of these
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language of rights; his focus is on the failure of
leadership of the universities. But to claim a right
here for rural Americans would have moral and legal
force not open to a utilitarian. While such an argument
would not argue for preservation of family farms
because of their intrinsic value, it would provide a
basis for continued public financial support until such
time as the land-grant institutions do attend to their
original mission.
Tweeten comments that mid-sized farms do realize
the best economies of size but "lean toward
inefficiency...due to greater costs of federal commodity
programs, slightly higher food costs, and less exports,"
but these are offset by better rural social life than could
be expected in an area populated only by larger farms
(p. 228). Perhaps research directed to truly benefit the
small and mid-sized farms would give them the
competitive edge they need. This is a commitment that
was made to rural Americans by the legislators in
setting aside the land grants, the experiment stations,
and extension service. They have every right to demand
their due.
The above argument from justice is not made
explicitly in the book, although Comstock notes that
Hightower is making claims based on the notion of
desert. Its omission may be partially explained by its
not having been represented in the speakers' talks of
the 1985 conference. From a philosophical point of
view, though, the book would be considerably improved
by the addition of a thorough discussion of the most
important ethical theoretical frameworks being debated
in applied ethics today. Philosophers in this century
have made an intense study of the relative strengths,
coherence, and consistency of the nature and interrelationship of ethical claims. Especially well-studied
are moral rights theories, Kantian duty-based ethics,
and utilitarianism. Despite the claims of Tweeten and
Comstock that utilitarianism is "the most widely shared
ethical system in America" (p. 246: cf. p. 407), a look
at the philosophical literature, at the legal system, and
at the Bill of Rights of the Constitution will cast that
claim into considerable doubt. Even ordinary people
who think it right to bring about the most good will not
agree that this should be accomplished without
limitations that protect individual rights. A discussion
of ethical frameworks could also shed light on the
questions of distributive and retributive justice that
underlie many of the other essays. While it is
understandable that a 400-plus-page volume would have

arguments more closely. Hightower continues his
argument for the family farm, and one can infer from
his remarks that family farmers are owed a redress for
past injustices in the failure of land-grants to aid them
through research. That takes the form of a societal
promise unfulfilled. Luther Tweeten disagrees with
Hightower, using statistics which should be compared
with those in Hightower's earlier essay. Tweeten
concludes that "public research, education, and
extension programs have provided a massive contribution to social justice by reducing costs of food"
(p. 228). Low income people both here and abroad
have enjoyed the greatest benefits.
Tweeten's argument is based on a stated attempt to
correlate his economic arguments with a utilitarian
version of social justice. This will doubtless provide
little comfort to Hightower and his supporters.
Essentially, Tweeten has to agree that even if it is true
that the land grants have not provided rural America
with the benefits promised in the establishment of these
institutions, no wrong has been done, since other people
who are also needy were benefitted instead. Perhaps
even more good (in economic terms) has been done by
not fulfilling the mission originally prescribed. But
Tweeten defines social justice solely in economic terms.
Although Hightower does not make an argument for
redress in just this way, I think it is open to him and
others to reject Tweeten's argument on the basis that
social justice involves not merely economic
redistributions from high to low income groups but also
questions of desert. The creation of social institutions
brings concomitant justifications for their creation,
which in turn bring into existence valid expectations in
the populace for which the institution was created.
These take the form of a contractual obligation on the
part of government to provide specified benefits.
Although utilitarian versions of social justice seem
initially appealing, we do not think that justice should
be gotten by false promises whether or not it maximizes
economic profit or even societal conditions.
In essence, rural Americans have trusted the landgrants to benefit them while they, in turn, work and farm
to benefit those others in need of low-cost food. Instead,
rural America and family farms have been made worse
off while others have benefitted. This is an injustice
not simply because some are better off at the expense
of others, but because farmers have a right to expect
what has been promised them in the Morrill Act and
subsequent legislation. Hightower does not use the
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little space for such additional material, one still cannot
help feel its absence.
As part of the conference papers, a section on
religious ethics appears as Part VI. This section may
have value to those who already accept the religious
premises that underlie any further claims, but for others
it may have less value. The problem is that to have any
validity at all, one must first accept that God exists and
that God is a law-giver and that those laws are open to
clear understanding by all. The arguments have little
meaning for one who rejects any of these conditions. In
fact, the essays included in this volume exhibit a wide
variation of interpretations of a Scripture which makes
no explicit or direct commenton the complex issues facing
farmers and policymakers today. Moreover, only the
Christian tradition is represented, and these arguments
may have little validity for those of other faiths.
Comstock closes the volume with his own very nice
summary of five arguments for saving the family farm.
The first four he finds represented in the essays in the
volume, and the fifth is his own contribution. These he
titles the arguments from emotion, from efficiency, from
stewardship, from cultural identity, and from
responsibility. He thinks all but the last fail. The
argument from emotion is expressed by those who
would incite our sympathy, national pride, feelings of
tradition, and the like. Comstock rehearses the reasons
that such feelings alone do not constitute sufficient
reason for ajudgment of moral obligation. Commenting
that emotions are important to moral reasoning, he
leaves the issue of how important they are or in what
way they function unanswered.
The argument from efficiency he finds wanting also,
and here his criticisms take the form of invoking the
standard objections to utilitarianism. This section is
important because it is one of the few places in the
volume where a systematic analysis of the consistency
of our moral claims is attempted. However, Comstock
appears at times to conflate utilitarianism and
economics. A thoughtful utilitarian need not count
economic efficiency as her sole value, and indeed, most
do not. Classical utilitarians (Bentham, Mill) argue for
the promotion of pleasure or happiness, and many
contemporary utilitarians argue for the promotion of
preference-satisfactions (e.g., Hare, Bennett). The latter
group are neutral on value claims and would not make
economic efficiency the primary value. Still, it would
probably remain a value among other values, and could
be an important consideration in concerns about equity.
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Utilitarians can reject monetary economic efficiency
as a supreme value, since it is well-known that such
arrangements may not maximize preferencesatisfactions or even produce the most happiness
overall. So, given the chance, a utilitarian could easily
counter many of Comstock's claims, although I do agree
that making arguments from economic efficiency alone
fails as a justification for saving the family farm.
Comstock also makes the claim that since
arguments from efficiency are contingent in nature,
they cannot be moral arguments. Apparently, a moral
argument must be categorical in nature, and this is
consistent with a Kantian view of morality and may
be consistent with Comstock's own preference for a
Christian moral framework, though he espouses a
preference for a utilitarianism in combination with the
Christian view. Still, the claim that arguments based
on contingency cannot be moral arguments is false.
The concern with what we ought to do always brings
in considerations of fact, and no facts about the world
are categorical-all are contingent. No arguments from
efficiency are wholly contingent, however, since all
make categorical claims about the value of efficiency
itself. Perhaps what Comstock is concerned about is
the absence of a categorical moral claim that would
link the categorical value of efficiency to a categorical
virtue extent in the activity of family farming. Only
that link would allow us to conclude that family farms
ought to be saved because they are most efficient. The
problem is that we do not think such a virtue exists, and
so the argument fails.
Comstock's discussion of the argument from
stewardship concerns secular and religious arguments
for supporting family farmers as protectors of the land
and domesticated species. In keeping with my
comments above about the absence of an adequate
discussion of moral rights frameworks, I have several
concerns about this section. The secular position for
this argument he takes to rest on rights-claims, and he
mentions rights in the environment and Regan's view
of animal rights. Unfortunately, there is no exposition
of these arguments. Instead, he states that "it is
extremely difficult to generate philosophical arguments
that would convince most persons that land and animals
have rights" (p. 409), and in the next sentence he
reiterates that "the case is extremely difficult to make."
The reader is not told why this should be so nor what
Regan's reasons are for making his case. Instead,
Comstock tells us that "most persons" don't believe
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animals have rights, that Kant didn't think animals had
rights, nor did Mill and Bentham. We are not told that
Kant's theory would not allow the senile and insane
rights either nor that Mill and Bentham would not
ascribe rights to anyone, much less to animals. We are
also told that "most philosophers" think animals do not
have rights, a statement unsupported by data and
irrelevant unless we assume that these philosophers
have all read Regan's works and are prepared to refute
his claims with sound arguments of their own.
Comstock does think we should be concerned with
animal welfare, but he gives theological reasons for this.
They remain our tools, but we should not treat them
cruelly. He does not admit a utilitarian duty to weigh
the interests of animals along with those of humans.
What we find in this section is a reiteration of the
common belief that "there is nothing wrong with killing
animals to feed ourselves so long as we do not cause
them to suffer in the meantime" (p. 410). He does
encourage development of farm practices which will
insure the health and happiness of farm animals.
Comstock does claim that animals and even some ways
of life have intrinsic worth. That, combined with his
apparent preference for categorical claims, suggests
that, if he were to free himself from what appears to be
theological permission to use animals to fulfill our
needs, he might find that a consistent moral and even
theological view would place him closer to Regan's
camp than he supposes.
Finally, Comstock attacks the question of whether
family farmers are necessarily good stewards.
Although Comstock thinks that "the case can be
made...that fam ily farmers treat their animals best and
are the best stewards of the land," he offers no data to
support this claim. In fact, data offered in an earlier
article showed that family farmers were no more likely
to practice soil conservation than large corporate
farmers, and Comstock's claim here apparently rests
on the theoretical claim that family farmers should
care more about the land, since they will be thinking
about passing the farm on to their offspring.
Apparently, this psychological factor does not carry
enough weight to motivate all or almost all family
farmers to be good stewards.
But Comstock does not avail himself of this reason
to reject the argument from stewardship. Again, he
rejects the argument based on its contingency. Because
we should preserve family farms only if it is the best
arrangement for preserving the land and protecting
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domestic animals, Comstock finds this argument failing.
But, as pointed out above, contingent arguments can
be moral arguments. It is simply that Comstock wishes
to narrow the kind of answer we are seeking to that of a
categorical imperative that such arguments fail. If what
we wish to know is whether we should save the family
farm for the time being (something legislators might
want to know), then an argument from stewardship,
coupled with data showing family farmers are actually
or even more likely to be good stewards, would present
a good moral reason for preserving the institution.
Unfortunately, the data are either lacking or
unsupportive of the conclusion. However, since moral
arguments are supposed to move persons to action, it
might still be true that family farmers are more open to
being motivated by the claim that they ought to be good
stewards. If that were true ( and it seems to me such a
claim is testable), then we might still make a claim that
we ought to save the family farm as long as sufficient
ways can be found to make family farmers behave as
responsible stewards. Although I am not as convinced
as Comstock that the argument from stewardship fails,
a more thorough treatment of this subject deserves more
space than can be given here.
The fourth argument that is discussed Comstock
dubs the argument from cultural identity. Most of what
is discussed is the supposed link between democracy
and family farm ownership. Comstock accedes that
Thomas Jefferson's claim of a necessary connection
between private farm property ownership and
democracy seems refuted. Nevertheless, he is
concerned about the concentration of power that may
result if farm operations come into the hands solely of
large corporations. Thi~ is a serious problem that should
concern us all. Still, it does not provide a basis for
saying the family farm as such should be saved. Again,
the reasons apparently connect to Comstock's
requirement of a categorical reason. Another aspect of
the cultural identity argument seems to be linked to the
argument from emotion-that the family farm is "a
structure that keeps us in touch with our emotions and
our past, and thereby with ourselves" (p. 415).
Comstock thinks that all of the good reasons
offered in the four arguments above-caring and
concern, efficiency, stewardship, and cultural identitywhile insufficient individually can work together to offer
a strong argument (from responsibility) for preserving
the family farm. Here, he invokes our responsibilities
to future generations to pass on a good environment
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and a cultural heritage. He does not get what he had
hoped for, namely, a categorical argument for saving
the family farm. But this does not seem necessary
anyway for reasons noted above.
The question of what we ought to do as a nation
seems to me to be more complex, however. Preservation
of the traditional family farm and rural life will require
the outlay of public funds; all are in agreement about
that. Decisions about the rightness or wrongness of
providing such funds must be made within the context
of shrinking economic and natural resources and of
other claims for the protection of many different kinds
of interests. Some of these interests are based on the
prior commitments of the government to serve the
population in certain ways, and other interests take the
form of claims concerning basic human rights. Family
farmers must make their claims about justice within an
ongoing social sphere that is populated, for instance,
by the inner city poor and homeless, the increasing
poverty of our children, high infant mortality, inequity
in health care and education, and the continued
mistreatment of animals and the environment. It may
well be that we should save family farms, but there will
be a price to pay in unmet needs of others. Thus, we
must have a clearer understanding of the interrelationship of these interests and of how to give them
just consideration. I think this precludes categorical
conclusions about the fate of the family farm but leaves
open the possibility for making good arguments about
how our institutions should be arranged to protect the
public interest and individual rights.
Notwithstanding my reservations noted above, I
recommend this book to those who are interested in
exploring these issues in some depth. No text or
anthology can encompass all views. Most of the essays
are clear, well-written, and accessible to even the novice.
I have no doubt that as a classroom text it will provoke
a large amount of useful debate and enlightenment.

Response:
The Rights of Animals
and Family Farmers
Gary Comstock
Iowa State University
It is a pleasure to be asked to comment on Kathryn
P. George's review, and not only because she so
insightfully criticizes the book I edited. Her review
provides me the additional opportunity to declare in
public that I have changed my mind about the respective
rights of animals and family farmers. As George points
out, I argue in my conclusion that you can defend
traditional family farms and animals. My reason is that,
even though the backbone of family farming is the
raising and slaughtering of food animals, smaller sized
"family" farms seem more likely than larger sized
"factory" farms to provide animals with humane care,
room to exercise, and quick, painless deaths.
Since finishing Famity Farm, I have come to believe
that humane care and slaughter are not the issues. The
issues are whether we harm animals with central nervous
systems when we kill them, and whether we have the
right to continue breeding mammals, with no other
purpose in mind than to carve them into steaks at a young
age. This is likely to be the issue of most concern to
readers of BTS, so I begin here, reserving for later my
comments on George's criticisms of my family farm
argument.
I have learned from feminists and narrativists the
value of first person stories in ethical discourse, and I
think it is important for ethicists to tell their stories,
especially when they have given up major parts of their
background beliefs. I have given up a major part of my
background beliefs, and I must tell you how it happened.
I was not motivated by professional considerations

Notes
I The definition of just what constitutes a "family-farm"
has been the center of contention, since many large corporate
farms, such as Cargill, are owned and operated by a family.
rn the "rntroduction," Comstock accepts Luther Tweeten's
definition with a modification noted here in italics: "a family
farm is an agricultural operation loved, worked, and owned
by a family or family corporation, with gross annual sales of
forty thousand dollars to two hundred thousand dollars. hiring
less than 1.5 person-years of labor" (p. xxv).
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